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This article discusses the evolution of the common law concerning the phenomenon 
of transsexualism while seeking to identity the place occupied in that process by the 
decision of Justice Richard Chisholm (as he then was) in Re Kevin: Validity of 
Marriage of Transsexual  [2001] FamCA 1074 (‘Re Kevin’) and the affirming 
decision of the Full Court of Family Court of Australia in respect of the appeal of 
that decision in The Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v "Kevin and 
Jennifer" and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2003] FamCA 94 
(‘Re Kevin-Full Court’); collectively referred to as ‘the Re Kevin decisions’. The 
article examines the phenomenon of transsexualism, associated language, 
terminology and causation issues as well as discussing the legal rights of young 
people in respect of medical treatment for transsexualism aided by a critique of the 
Australian decision Re Alex – Hormonal Treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria 
[2004] FamCA 297. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Transsexualism is a form of human diversity in sexual formation, reported since 
antiquity, in which an individual experiences her or himself to be of the sex 
opposite to that indicated by the individual’s original sexually differentiated body 
combined with a compelling need to alter that sexually differentiated body in order 
                                                        
*
 Principal, Wallbanks. The author represented and appeared as counsel on behalf of ‘Kevin’ and 
‘Jennifer’ in Re Kevin, both at trial and on appeal, with the significant assistance throughout of Ms T J 
Anderson, barrister, Sydney. Further material and pleadings concerning the Re Kevin proceedings as well 
as articles by the author, biographical information, useful references and links are available at the 
Resources and Links section of the author’s firm’s website <http://www.wallbanks.com> . 
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to bring it into better harmony with the individual’s innate sexual identity 
(otherwise called neurological, psychological or brain sex).1  
 
Such a discussion necessarily involves the story of the struggle for human rights of 
the people who live this particular example of difference in human sexual 
formation.  That story is continuing to unfold in various ways throughout the world 
and is experiencing a particularly rich period. A review of the medical science, case 
law and legislation affecting people living with transsexualism around the planet 
indicates, as one might expect, that different cultures experience and respond to the 
phenomenon of transsexualism in different ways in the same way that 
transsexualism triggers a significant range of different personal reactions. In a 
world struggling with difference, the phenomenon of transsexualism is to the health 
of cultures what the canary was to the air quality of mines. 
 
The more I learn about this subject, the more similarities I see between the struggle 
of people who experience transsexualism (and their families) for human rights and 
the Civil Rights Movement in the United States of America. The marriage of 
Sydney couple, ‘Kevin’ and ‘Jennifer’2 on 21st August 1999, in defiance of the 
advice of the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department that they had no right 
to marry (and that ‘Kevin’ would commit a criminal offence if he tried to do so), 
and their subsequent successful legal battle to pursue their human and civil rights 
against the Australian Government which commenced 18th October 1999, echo the 
refusal of Rosa Parks to give up her seat to a white man on a bus in Montgomery, 
Alabama, USA on Thursday, 1st December 1955, her arrest and the successful legal 
battle for civil rights for African Americans that followed.  
 
Both these human rights struggles are international and ongoing. Both have 
involved court proceedings, a struggle for legislative reform and medical argument 
concerning the legal and social recognition of these minority peoples as legitimate 
human beings with equal rights; rather than being assigned a lesser status due to the 
colonised mystification and distortion of their reality by the dominant culture. The 
discrimination and harm suffered by both such minorities because of their 
difference have driven some of their members to deny their own being through the 
use of ‘stealth’ and ‘passing’3 as social survival methods. Finally, both these legal 
and human rights struggles are about seeking to rehabilitate and claim legitimate 
identity in the world; and at that fundamental level both have required minority 
                                                        
 
1
 Substantial information, resources and links concerning transsexualism generally and its aetiology can 
be accessed at the Australian WOMAN Network website at <http://www.w-o-m-a-n.net>. Lynn 
Conway’s site at <http://www.lynnconway.com> is excellent for an appreciation of the history of 
transsexualism (although she uses the term “transgender” interchangeably with “transsexualism” in the 
American way). People living with transsexualism were undergoing sex affirmation surgery since 
ancient times. 
2
 Pseudonyms used to protect identity. See also Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 121. 
3
 See Appendix A for a description of passing contained in an excerpt from the essay by Sandy Stone,      
‘A Post transsexual Manifesto’, in Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub (Eds) Body Guards (1991) 298-299. 
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group members finding their own prejudice-free language with which to tell the 
world their stories and be understood afresh. 
 
It is really no wonder that transsexualism remains so difficult to approach 
academically; involving such a multidisciplinary medicolegal/sociological 
landscape covered by a fog of mystified, medicalised and prejudiced language. In 
the circumstances, I have sought to guide the reader to a clearer perspective from 
which to consider the place occupied by the Re Kevin decisions through first briefly 
discussing the predicament of transsexualism itself, the issues concerning language 
and terminology and the historic debate concerning the causation of transsexualism, 
before finally looking at the place occupied by the Re Kevin decisions in the 
common law heritage of Australia, New Zealand, the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom concerning transsexualism.  Finally, I deal with the issue of the 
care, welfare and legal rights in respect of medical treatment of children and 
adolescents with transsexualism.  
 
 
II BACKGROUND 
 
Although debate exists as to the number of people with transsexualism in any 
cultural group, it is reasonable to assume that there are at least about 5,000 people 
of all ages with transsexualism in Australia.4 Underestimation of numbers is 
common throughout the world due the effects of shame and secrecy. Suicide and 
lessor forms of self-harm, in young and old alike, caused by the experience of the 
difference of transsexualism generally go unidentified as such.  
 
People with transsexualism have families and often have children. Many people 
with transsexualism (together with their family members and loved ones) live out 
their lives in secrecy because of their fear of how society (and their neighbour) will 
deal with them in the event that they disclose the existence, or the history, of their 
transsexualism. This is particularly the case when children and adolescents affirm a 
sex different to that to which they were first assigned.  
 
The survival method called ‘stealth’ is a version of "passing" but embodies one’s 
living one’s public life in denial of one’s experience of transsexualism. The bargain 
of choosing to live a false and secret existence in order to live free of physical harm 
and/or prejudice that is the act of ‘passing’ should be familiar to most as it is 
something most of us are obliged to do in intermittent and small ways on a daily 
basis to satisfy our culture’s rapacious demand for conformity. Passing is the same 
activity undertaken by some ‘people of colour’ who have permitted themselves to 
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be mistaken for ‘white’ in order to avoid the prejudicial treatment they would have 
otherwise received.5   
 
For a variety of reasons, including culturally cultivated shame, ignorance, the desire 
to procreate, good intentions and the erroneous medical advice that transsexualism 
is treatable by denial, many people with transsexualism only affirm their innate sex 
later in life and after they have married, formed de facto relationships and/or borne 
children in their first assigned sex. Again, because of shame, such sex affirmation 
may well come as a surprise to partners, children, parents, other family members, 
in-laws, workmates, colleagues and employers. The reaction to the revelation of an 
individual’s sex affirmation can range from appreciation and support to 
condemnation and rejection in a culture where, at worst, ignorance of 
transsexualism is rife and, at best, transsexualism is likely to be confused with other 
phenomena such as transgender expression, transvestism or sexuality.  
 
Significant parenting and social issues can accompany a parent’s sex affirmation. 
Sex affirmation, often occurring at or near separation, can result in a substantial loss 
of income, if not gainful employment, for the person with transsexualism. The total 
medical costs of sex affirmation treatment (still not publicly funded in Australia, 
although it is in the United Kingdom) can amount to as much as AUD$50,000.00. 
People with transsexualism die or their lives are abused and degraded by their 
efforts to fund the price of such treatment. As normal employment is often lost as a 
result of an individual’s sex affirmation, many younger people with transsexualism 
turn to prostitution or other crime in their desperation to fund sex affirmation 
treatment. Many, too old for prostitution, ostracised by family, friends and culture 
and without the monetary means to attain treatment for their transsexualism, suffer 
severe depression, self-harm and often take their own lives. Difference can be a 
health hazard. Shame kills. 
 
Children and adolescents with transsexualism suffer in their dependency. The 
voices of these young people, from pre-puberty to adulthood, clearly stating their 
predicament and seeking help, are too often ignored, ridiculed or interpreted as 
illness or disorder; not only by their parents and family members but by well-
meaning members of the medical, legal and health care professions. I do not intend 
to be simplistically critical of the hard working medical practitioners and others 
who have sought to assist people with transsexualism. My contention is that the 
error of the disorder model of transsexualism and the continued association of 
transsexualism with pathology through the use of such terms as Gender Dysphoria 
and Gender Identity Disorder is the result of cultural, rather than individual, 
prejudice born of a pan-cultural genitocentrism6 that finds the difference of 
transsexualism almost too challenging to tolerate or accept.  
                                                        
5
 Stone, above n 3, 298. 
6
 Meaning centred upon the genitalia as the factor of sexual differentiation that determines an 
individual’s sex. For an interesting analysis of this concept and the history and debate in respect of the 
causation (natural/organic or pathological) see Andrew N Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence, 
Dysphoric Bodies of Law (2002) 39.  
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In order to receive treatment for their transsexualism, such young people (and their 
parents/guardians) must negotiate their way through the malaise of outdated 
medical and legal categorisations of childhood and adolescent transsexualism; 
which both mystify and pathologise their diagnosis and prejudice their treatment.  
 
In Australia, as a result of the recent decision of Re Alex – Hormonal Treatment for 
Gender Identity Dysphoria,7 young people with transsexualism and their 
parents/guardians are required to obtain the approval of the Family Court of 
Australia, exercising its child welfare jurisdiction, before such children and 
adolescents can receive medically approved nonsurgical hormonal and other 
treatment for their condition; notwithstanding that such treatment is also approved 
by the children’s parents. Before Re Alex the conservative non-surgical medical 
treatment for transsexualism that is normally followed in childhood and 
adolescence was available with parental consent upon proper and thorough 
diagnosis by medical practitioners under States’ child welfare legislation.8  
 
People living with transsexualism undergo irreversible sex affirmation treatment 
(including genital surgery) on their own initiative because of their need to 
experience sexual harmony between body and mind and not because of any legal 
requirement.  This distinguishing aspect of transsexualism, and the consequential 
medico legal reform sought by people living with transsexualism, were not explored 
or adequately acknowledged in Re Alex.   
 
As Re Alex came after the Re Kevin decisions, but represents a significantly 
different perception of transsexualism, at least as manifested in young people, and 
has been interpreted so as to give rise to considerable hardship for such young 
people and their parents seeking such treatment, I will deal with that decision 
separately. 
 
The experience of transsexualism, even in a culture conceived of as compassionate, 
remains the experience of ongoing significant and sometimes life-threatening 
personal, social, educational, medical and legal crises. The predicament is made 
worse by a lack of public funding for medical treatment and a pervasive ignorance 
and/or misconception amongst members of the medical profession as to the nature 
of transsexualism existing in a public policy vacuum and an absence of truly equal 
or complete civil rights. 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia and its States have no uniform legislation dealing 
with intersexual rights, including those of people with transsexualism, and the 
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 [2004] FamCA 297 (13 April 2004) (‘Re Alex’). 
8
 The author is in possession of the legal advice NSW Health to that effect, which has been relied upon 
by NSW Health to deny and suspend the provision of medical treatment for transsexualism in childhood 
and adolescence in NSW, which had been approved prior to the decision in Re Alex, pending such young 
people’s parents making successful individual applications to obtain the authorisation of the Family 
Court of Australia.   
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reassignment/alteration/correction of the legal sex9 of such individuals. All States 
now have legislation that, subject to certain inhumane conditions, enables people 
with transsexualism and other intersexual conditions who have undergone 
irreversible sex affirmation (re-assignment) treatment to effect a re-assignment of 
their legal sex.10 In Australia, once a person’s legal sex has been reassigned the 
person is legally of the re-assigned sex.  
 
A statutory obligation is imposed upon the Registrars of each Australian State or 
Territory, who maintain the records of our legal particulars (including our assigned 
legal sex) that such records be contemporaneously accurate. Australian civil and 
criminal authorities, as well as the public, rely upon the contemporaneous accuracy 
of such particulars which are evidenced by the issue of a certified Birth Certificate.  
To be found to be representing oneself contrary to such particulars can have 
increasingly dire consequences in a world where legal identity, legality and security 
are interdependent concepts.  
 
People with transsexualism and other intersexual people who have undergone 
irreversible sex affirmation treatment have only been permitted to correct or update 
the particulars as to their legal identity if they comply with such inhumane and 
strange conditions as the requirement they divorce their life-long spouse;11 but 
people in legally recognised de facto relationships are not required to terminate 
their relationships in order to have their legal sex re-assigned. Here married people 
with transsexualism fall victim to a misplaced legally expressed homophobia that 
fails to appreciate the workings of the marriage law of Australia, as clarified in Re 
Kevin, that the validity of a marriage, and hence the sex of the parties to a marriage, 
are to be determined as at the date of the marriage. The ‘sex of the parties’ means 
their common law sex and does not require or invite some scientific investigation 
and or argument as to which (or which set) of the sexually differentiated aspects of 
a person determine their possibly multi-faceted biological sex. The withholding of 
the right to an accurate legal identity from a person of transsexual background 
because that person desires to continue to honour a marriage that has endured their 
transsexualism has nothing to say about the sex (or sexuality) of the couple at the 
time of the marriage and is clearly inhumane and against the public interest that 
would seek to honour an enduring marriage.     
 
Other people living with transsexualism, such as children (other than infants), who 
through the circumstances of age or health are simply unable to undergo irreversible 
                                                        
9
 The Legal Sex of a person means the sex which is usually first assigned to the person at near the birth 
event by a medical practitioner as a result of a casual inspection of the person’s external genitalia (only) 
and which is recorded amongst the particulars of the legal identity of that person in the register (in 
Australia called the ‘Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages’) maintained for that purpose by States. 
Such particulars are evidenced by, or published as, the person’s birth certificate.    
10
 Victoria, which introduced legislation in 2004 for the reassignment of legal sex, was the last State to 
do so.  
11
 SCAG (The States Council of Attorney’s General) has had this issue on its agenda for many years 
without result. 
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sex affirmation treatment, are precluded from the right to have their legal sex 
reassigned.  
 
There seems to me to be no good legal or public policy reason why a married 
person should not be able to have her or his legal sex reassigned. There are several 
such policy considerations to recommend the removal of that inhumane prohibition. 
Similarly, there is no legislative impediment of which I am aware that would 
prevent the creation by States of a dual regime for the reassignment of legal sex 
whereby those people who have undergone irreversible sex affirmation treatment 
need only evidence that treatment to a State Registrar in order to have their legal 
sex reassigned, while those unable to do so because of conditions of health or age 
could make an exceptional application to an expert panel evidencing their 
predicament in order to have their legal sex reassigned, on either a permanent or 
provisional basis, on the ground of hardship.  After all, law makers in medieval 
times were able to provide laws for the reassignment of legal sex of a person 
whereby in adulthood and prior to marriage, a person could, by sworn 
“promissionary oath”, publicly renounce one sex and declare an oath to exclusively 
adhere to the other for the rest of his or her life.12 
 
We live at a time when biological sex is increasingly being recognised as diverse 
and multidimensional (making understandable the existence of intersexual human 
beings) and where the assignment of legal sex can be mistaken and corrected. By 
the time of the Sydney Olympic Games chromosomal sex testing had been 
abandoned, due to the acceptance by the IOC that there were simply too many 
genuine female athletes who possessed “Y” chromosomes competing.  By the time 
of the Athens Olympics the IOC had moved to permit people with transsexualism 
who had undergone sex affirmation surgery to compete in their affirmed sex.  
 
Legally, we need to be able to identify and distinguish between an individual’s 
predominant biological sex, legal sex, and common law sex (the sex declared/ 
declarable by a court for certain purposes) in order to properly consider the legal 
predicament of people living with transsexualism and other intersexual conditions. 
 
Thus, one can begin to expand the possibilities of intersexuality in human beings 
while accepting that the question of whether one is able to live a reasonable life as a 
male or a female is ultimately determined by one’s brain-sex differentiation rather 
than the appearance of one’s genitalia and/or other sexually differentiated body 
parts. To quote Professor Milton Diamond concerning biologically derived sexual 
identity: ‘It’s what’s between the ears that counts and not what’s between the legs’.   
 
And while a more subtle appreciation of the biology of sexual determination may 
assist, it is well to remain aware that the test for the determination of an individual’s 
legal and common law sex and (and legal gender in the UK), and whether an 
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 Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis and Friedemann Pfafflin, ‘Transgenderism and Intersexuality in Childhood 
and Adolescence - Making Choices’ (2003) 155.  
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individual’s legal sex can be re-assigned, are each different from one another and 
are each different again from those concerning an individual’s biological sex.  
 
Legal categorisations and classifications are as least as much cultural as they are 
biological considerations.  To quote Chisholm J in Re Kevin ‘…the fundamental 
task of the law…, in a legal and social context that divides all human beings into 
male and female, is to assign individuals to one category or the other, including 
individuals whose characteristics are not uniformly those of one or other sex.’13 
After all, stripped of its mystery, the first assignment of infant’s legal sex is as 
much a cultural and legal act as it is a biological one. 
 
As we permit transsexualism to be perceived in our culture as a natural aspect of 
human diversity, rather than a disorder, increasing numbers of people with 
transsexualism of all ages (and their parents/families/loved ones) are seeking to 
pursue their legal and human rights in respect of issues relating to education, 
relationships, wills, estates, discrimination and identity.  
 
The good news is that, from individuals to government, people around the world are 
demonstrating an increasingly comprehensive capacity to appreciate the 
predicament of transsexualism and a willingness to assist people with 
transsexualism to live full lives.14 I was delighted recently when a senior legal 
officer of the New South Wales Education Department coined the name "Safe and 
Successful" to describe the policy we are seeking to develop in order to assist young 
people with transsexualism in New South Wales government schools.  
    
III LANGUAGE 
 
Language and terminology represent a major obstacle for anyone seeking to 
understand and meaningfully discuss this subject because the language that has 
developed with regard to transsexualism has been affected by the impact of long-
standing diverse cultural prejudice, ignorance and mystification; whether or not that 
language has been the creation of medicine, law or community. 
 
As for any colonised people, and as it was for Civil Rights activists, the challenge 
for people with transsexualism is to find and express their own stories and identity 
in their own language reflective of their own experience of life rather than that of 
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 Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074, [ 315]. 
14
 The Gender Recognition Act 2004 in the United Kingdom, although problematic, is also evidence of 
this welcome trend, as is the progress made in Iran where the Islamic government has recognised 
transsexualism, allows its citizens to undergo sex affirmation treatment with surgery funded by the state, 
and issues new birth certificates in the affirmed sex. Iran's Muslim clerics, who dominate the judiciary, 
are becoming considerably better informed about transsexualism. Some clerics now even recommend sex 
affirmation treatment with surgery to those whom they consider suffer from transsexualism. The issue 
was discussed at a conference in Tehran in June 2004 that drew officials from other Persian Gulf 
countries. 
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the normative or dominant culture. In their seemingly never-ending ‘identity 
debates’, people with transsexualism are, in fact, undergoing the difficult but 
necessary process of finding and developing their own meanings and language 
concerning transsexualism.  
 
In Australia that process was stimulated by the experience of the Re Kevin 
proceedings and the detailed trial and appeal decisions; which required the 
expression of the experience of transsexualism to the Family Court of Australia and 
the general public in a demystified and intelligible way.  
 
Neither the United Kingdom or the United States of America, the other prime 
places of language development in the English speaking world with regard to 
transsexualism, have developed anywhere near as rich or consistently affirmative a 
common law and legislative tradition in respect of transsexualism as that of 
Australia. In my view, Australia’s distinct and developing language usage in respect 
of transsexualism, substantially nurtured by that socio/legal tradition, should be of 
interest worldwide in terms of its affirmation, clarification and creativity.  I have 
sought to use such affirmative language throughout this article – including the 
following significant terms: 
 
• People (or a person) living with transsexualism – is used rather than the 
demeaning objectifying noun “transsexual”; 
• A person is said to have affirmed their (innate) sex – rather than 
“transitioned  (public sexes), when a person with transsexualism seeks to 
live a public life consistent with their innate or neurological sex rather than 
their first assigned legal sex; 
• legal sex – is used to describe the sex of a person recorded in a register 
with the other legally identifying particulars of that person maintained in 
Australia by the States’ Registrars of Births, Deaths and Marriages. A 
person’s legal sex is usually assigned at or near their birth event and is 
evidenced by the person’s birth certificate;15 
• A person living with transsexualism who has affirmed the female sex after 
having been first assigned to the male legal sex is referred to as a female 
with transsexualism or an affirmed female rather than a "male-to-female 
transsexual" or an "MtF”. Similarly, a person living with transsexualism 
who has affirmed the male sex in contradiction to the person’s first 
assigned female legal sex is referred to as a male with transsexualism or 
an affirmed male rather than a "female-to-male transsexual" or an "FtM"; 
• All that therapy and medical treatment involved in the rehabilitative 
process of harmonising a person’s sexually differentiated body with the 
person's sexually differentiated mind, including hormonal treatment, 
counselling, hair removal, voice training and surgery in respect of both 
genitalia and secondary sexual characteristics such as breasts is referred to 
as sex affirmation treatment. Such treatment should also properly involve 
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 See above n 9 for a detailed description. 
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(but almost never does), as a social aspect, assistance to family, friends, 
school, work and other key environments in appreciating the difference of 
transsexualism. The surgical aspect of this treatment, and specifically the 
genital surgery, is referred to as sex affirmation surgery rather than "sex 
reassignment surgery" or "genital reassignment surgery"; 
• Once a person has undergone irreversible sex affirmation treatment 
(including sex affirmation surgery) such a person is said to be a person of 
transsexual background (or history). 
 
Those interested in a more thorough treatment of terminology in respect of 
transsexualism may find my paper, ‘Difference on Trial – Transsexualism in Family 
Law and De Facto Relationships Litigation’16 more useful.  
 
Clarity requires that an adequate distinction be made between transsexualism and 
other phenomena such as transgender expression, transvestism/cross-dressing and 
sexuality, as well as mental disorders properly described as Gender Dysphoria/ 
Gender Identity Disorder, and the development of a better cultural appreciation of 
the shared biological continuum occupied by transsexualism and other intersexual 
variations in human sexual formation. To do so is not to seek to devalue or offend 
any person so described, but only to better and properly express the true diversity of 
humanity in respect of sexuality, gender expression, sexual identity and mental 
health.   
 
For the purpose of this paper, and in an effort to seek common ground and meaning, 
I will generally adopt the usage/categorisation followed by the respected United 
Kingdom legal academic and ‘trans’ rights campaigner Stephen Whittle.17 Whittle 
effectively rejects the use of ‘transgender’ as a 'one-size-fits-all' descriptor of 
difference associated with appearance and uses the terms trans, transgender and 
transsexual as exact terms and distinct categories – described as follows using 
affirmative language: 
 
• Trans – those people who do not perceive of, or present, their gender 
identity in accordance with their first assigned legal sex, but who do not 
seek to live as, or identify as, other than the sex to which they were first 
assigned.  Cross-dressers (transvestites) are included in this group. 
• Transgender – all those people who live, or desire to live, a large part of 
their life in the role or dress of that gender opposite to that associated with 
the legal sex to which they were first assigned but who, unlike people with 
transsexualism, do not need or desire complete and irreversible sex 
affirmation treatment and, in particular, sex affirmation surgery and are a 
subgroup of the ‘trans community’.  
 
                                                        
16
 Prepared for and published by the Family Law Section of the Law Council of Australia for Family 
Law 2004 – see their website; <http://www.familylawsection.org.au> or see the resources section of the 
author’s website: <http://www.wallbanks.com> 
17
 Stephen Whittle, Respect and Equality – Transsexual and Transgender Rights (2002) xxii-xxiii.  
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While I agree with the distinction Whittle makes between trans, transgender and 
transsexualism, I do not share Whittle's opinion that people living with 
transsexualism, like those who live transgender, ‘...belong(s) to a sub-group of (the) 
trans community.’18 Beyond the experience of prejudice related to appearance, I do 
not perceive any shared experience or continuum existing between the people 
defined within Whittle's category of trans and people living with transsexualism.19  
 
Transsexualism’s common ground is within the intersexual continuum; especially 
having regard to the shared experience and need of a broad group of people within 
that continuum concerning medical treatment, surgery and the reassignment of legal 
sex as well as the consequent issues of medical and legal/human rights reform; 
especially in respect of young people.20  
 
Some transgender advocates fear and/or reject reliance upon a biological 
explanation for transsexualism even though no other reliable or sensible explanation 
exists.21  The ostensible reason for this perspective is the fear that such reliance will 
make people with transsexualism particularly vulnerable to eugenic practices that 
would eliminate transsexualism if a biological/genetic marker for transsexualism 
were identified.22  While this is perhaps a reasonable apprehension, it does not 
justify a refusal to provide a reasonable explanation for transsexualism when one 
exists; especially when that biological explanation positions transsexualism 
squarely within the intersexual continuum and clearly distinguishes transsexualism 
from trans and transgender, as well as the disorder diagnoses Gender Dysphoria and 
Gender Identity Disorder; while reinforcing the claims of people with 
transsexualism to equal and complete civil and human rights, including in respect of 
diagnosis and treatment. 
 
While people with transsexualism have been quietly seeking to be assimilated 
within the life of the general community, trans, transgender and Intersex lobby 
groups have been visible, active and effective. Hence the popular community 
consultation acronym “GLBTI” for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex. 
While it is important enough to distinguish gay, lesbian and bisexual sexualities 
here, transsexualism is presumed to get a voice in the generalised “transgender” or 
the medical construct and politically exclusive “Intersex”. In these circumstances, 
                                                        
18
 Ibid xxiii. 
19
 For another interesting discussion of such terminology, see Milton Diamond, ‘Sex and Gender are 
Different: Sexual Identity and Gender Identity are Different’ (2000) 7 Clinical Child Psychology & 
Psychiatry 320. Also see the discussion by Leslie Feinberg in the Preface to her book, Transgender 
Warriors (1996). 
20
 See the discussion of expert evidence in Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074, [209] to [273]; and 
particularly that of Professors Louis Gooren and Zhou and others discussed at [239] to [264] thereof. 
21
 For example, Claire McNab. Vice-President, Press for Change (UK), ‘The Life and Times of the Sliced 
Transsexual Brain’, Available on-line at: <http://www.pfc.org.uk/congress/abstr6/abs-042.htm>. This 
was a paper delivered at The 6th International Congress on Sex and Gender Diversity, ‘Reflecting 
Genders’, School of Law, Manchester Metropolitan University, 10th to 12th September 2004. 
22
 Ibid. 
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the distinct voice and needs of people living with transsexualism have often been 
lost or ignored. 
 
Medical discourse concerning transsexualism came to be dominated by Freudian 
inspired psychiatry and psychoanalysis which, while offering no sustainable 
explanation for the existence of transsexualism and psychiatry’s inability to 
‘treat’/eliminate/fix the phenomenon, objectified, pathologised and infantilised the 
people who experienced it; in the process projecting a genitocentric biological 
fundamentalism that proceeded to dominate the law in respect of transsexualism as 
epitomised by the English decision of Justice Ormrod in Corbett v Corbett (orse 
Ashley).23  
 
The genitocentric determination of the ‘biological’ or ‘true’ sex24 of a human being 
espoused in Corbett still seems to attract the fervent disparate support of such folk 
as the radically religious and the radically feminist. The one uniting factor or 
opinion at work here, and which was the cornerstone of the Corbett decision and the 
subsequent chain of decisions that relied upon the legal and scientific legitimacy of 
Corbett, is the proposition that the biological ‘truth’ of an individual human being’s 
sexual identity may be discerned by only one means – the appearance of the 
person’s genitalia at birth – no matter what the individual says of her/his own 
sexual identity, the evidence for the sexual differentiation of the human brain, what 
changes occur to the individual’s body (including the genitalia) during a lifetime or 
how that lifetime is lived. Even though the decision in Corbett espouses a 
‘biological’ test involving the assessment of a person's chromosomal sex and 
internal and external genitalia (only) at or near the birth event (only), the real 
predominance of genitalia in Ormrod J’s consideration is confirmed by his 
emphasis upon the functionality of female genitalia and the decision’s refusal to 
apply the same test to, or to deal with, the question of the common law sex of 
people with conditions of genital intersex. 
 
The normative presumption that one is the sex indicated by one’s genitalia is a 
subtle and deep-seated one. Even legislation drafted to enable people with 
transsexualism to re-assign their legal sex to bring it into conformity with their 
surgically affirmed sex commonly define sex affirmation surgery in terms of 
‘…assisting a person to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex…’25; 
where ‘opposite sex’ is used to denote a presumed pervasive biological truth 
                                                        
23
  [1971] P. 83 (‘Corbett’).  
24
 ‘Sexual identity’ is either subsumed in or presumed by ‘biological sex’ or assigned to the distinctly 
mysterious and unreliable realm of individual ‘psychology’ as that term is used in Corbett and other 
similar genitocentric traditions. 
25
 For an example, see Births, Deaths And Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) s 32A. Note the 
mistaken lobbyist inspired use of the term “transgender” therein instead of transsexualism. It is clear that 
the legislation was not intended to deal with people other than those who had undergone sex affirmation 
surgery defined as ‘a surgical procedure involving the alteration of a person’s reproductive organs 
carried out: (a) for the purpose of assisting a person to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex, 
or (b) to correct or eliminate ambiguities relating to the sex of the person.’ 
2004 Re Kevin In Perspective 13     
 
evidenced by the original assignment of a person’s sex usually based solely upon 
the appearance of external genitalia.     
 
The determination of the biological sex of an individual whose external genitalia 
have an appearance at birth which is sexually inconsistent with the individual's 
chromosomal formation and/or gonads or which has the characteristics of both male 
and female genitalia, is problematic under this genitocentric regime and is said to be 
neither male nor female but rather hermaphroditic; more recently termed ‘Intersex’ 
This limited approach, which is inconsistent with the culture’s insistence on people 
being either male or female, caused problems too for courts charged with the 
determination of whether such an individual was legally male or female; when at 
law there is no ‘third’ or ‘other’ legal space available in terms of sexual identity.26 
 
Until recently, this genitocentric vision of biological sex and sexual identity has so 
dominated our cultural psych, that transsexualism, as an example of intersexual 
variation in human sexual formation with no gross genital insignia, simply did not 
exist as a recognised biological, physiological or organic phenomenon and no 
language, whether medical or cultural, existed with which to describe it thus.  
 
While the discourse of expert medical science was, by the commencement of the Re 
Kevin proceedings, clearly speaking of intersexual phenomena in general, and 
transsexualism in particular, as examples of diversity in human sexual formation 
rather than aberration or disorder, general medical and legislative language 
continues to be genitocentric and to distinguish ‘psychological’ from ‘biological’ in 
respect of sexual formation, determination and identity.  
 
People with transsexualism, and especially children and adolescents, are still 
burdened with the misconceived, misleading and monistic psychiatric diagnoses of 
Gender Dysphoria or Gender Identity Disorder derived from the outdated medical 
presumption that the assertion by an individual of a sexual identity contrary to the 
sex indicated by their genitalia, gonads and chromosomes accompanied by a 
sustained and compelling expressed need to alter their bodies to obtain sexual 
harmony with that identity must indicate disorder and/or illness.   
IV HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN A PROBLEM LIKE TRANSSEXUALISM?  
 
Historically there have been three competing ‘nature verses nurture’ explanations 
advanced by medical science and psychiatry for the cause of transsexualism:27 
 
                                                        
26
 For two quite different judicial responses to this predicament, made without the benefit of the Re Kevin 
decisions, see the decisions in the (now discredited) Australian decision In the Marriage of C and D 
(falsely called C) (1979) 35 FLR 340 (‘C and D’) and the United Kingdom decision W v W [2001] 2 
WLR 673 (‘W v W’). 
27
 Michel, C Mormont1 and J J Legros, ‘A Psycho-Endocrinological Overview of Transsexualism’ 
(2001) 145 European Journal of Endocrinology 365. 
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• The Non-Conflictual Psychological Theory – where transsexualism is seen  
as a pathology (a mental illness, confusion or disturbance of a normal 
psychological development of sexual identity) where sexual identity is 
precociously fixed and untreatable except by assisting the sufferer to live 
as well as possible with the pathology from which he or she suffers; and 
 
•  The Conflictual Psychological Theory – where transsexualism is seen as a 
pathology (a mental illness, confusion or disturbance of a normal 
psychological development of sexual identity) where sexual identity is not 
fixed and continues to remain ambiguous throughout development and is 
thus treatable by psychotherapy; and 
 
•  The Biological Theory – whereby observations on the sexual dimorphic  
 character of the brain in animal studies (and lately some human studies) 
together with more recent genetic and behavioural studies propose that a 
human being’s sexual identity derives from the sexual differentiation of 
human brain as to either the male or the female sex, in the same way as the 
other sexually differentiated aspects of the human body such as the 
genitalia, and is fixed and unalterable by the completion of infancy at the 
latest irrespective of social environment; 
 
Transsexualism as a particular category of pathology or mental illness (‘gender 
dysphoria syndrome’) was included in the United States of American Psychiatrist’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, edn III (DSM-III) in 1980, 
but was then removed from the DSM-IV in 1994 when it was assimilated/subsumed 
into the more general category of sexual and gender identity disorders. This 
significant change in the way psychiatry perceived transsexualism coincided with 
the removal from the DSM (after significant political and medical lobbying) of 
homosexuality as a pathology or mental illness or disorder.28 The DSM-IV changed 
the professional psychoanalytic view that there was a difference between 
transsexualism and Gender Dysphoria/GID while at the same time providing a 
radically new differential diagnostic criterion for children and adults with 
transsexualism.29 
 
As a consequence of this alteration to the DSM, people who experience or exhibit 
all types of non-normal behaviour in respect of sexual and/or gender expression are 
now grouped together by psychiatry in the DSM-IV.30 In particular, this change to 
the DSM IV enabled psychiatry to continue to ‘legitimately’ treat (try to change to 
heterosexual/normal) homosexual children whose parents find their behaviour 
unacceptable; even though adult homosexuality can no longer be legitimately 
treated as a mental illness. 
 
                                                        
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
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Thus, the criteria for the diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria /Gender Identity Disorder 
in childhood contained in the DSM IV includes children with severe mental 
disorders, those who merely transgress accepted norms of gender expression such 
as those who exhibit transgender/cross-dressing behaviour/effeminate/tomboyish 
and those who are homosexual as well as those who experience transsexualism.31 
This consummate vagueness of diagnostic criteria permits psychiatrists to give the 
contradictory evidence (as they do in Re Alex) of the uncertainty of the diagnosis of 
Gender Dysphoria/Gender Identity Disorder in childhood and adolescence, and to 
express doubt as to whether a child with that diagnosis will develop adult 
transsexualism, simultaneously with their evidence of their regular successful 
diagnosis and treatment of transsexualism in children and adolescence. 
 
The best of these practitioners will admit, as they did in Re Kevin, that in practice 
transsexualism is self-diagnosed and that its treatment is self-prescribed in that 
children, adolescents and adults living with transsexualism generally come to the 
medical practitioner seeking sex affirmation treatment. The psychiatrist fulfils the 
important role of ‘gatekeeper’ by ruling out other phenomena such as disorders, 
homosexuality and transvestism, rather than actually identifying the causation of a 
person’s transsexualism. It is misleading and confusing to maintain a distinction 
between childhood and adult transsexualism and/or the possibility that there are 
varying degrees of a conglomerate phenomenon encompassing Gender Dysphoria 
/Gender Identity Disorder, transgender expression such as cross-dressing and 
transsexualism. Hence, the creation of such further misleading terms as Extreme 
Gender Identity Disorder and Extreme Gender Dysphoria by some experts seeking 
to deal with the inclusion of transsexualism within the diagnostic hotchpotch of 
Gender Dysphoria /Gender Identity Disorder.   
 
In Re Alex, after expressing himself to be uncomfortable with the term ‘disorder’ as 
applied by the expert witnesses to Alex, Chief Justice Nicholson (as he then was) 
used the hybrid term, ‘Gender Identity Dysphoria’,32 and applied it as part of the 
title of the case. Any reading of the decision indicates, however, that of all the 
participants in Re Alex, Alex himself was the least confused (or dysphoric) about 
his sexual identity.  Alex’s natural life goals and plans (for a young male with 
transsexualism), as well as his understandable frustration, anger and distress 
experienced in the care of those who reject his maleness after leaving the supportive 
and affirming environment of his father’s care, are given a pathological ‘spin’ by 
the psychiatric evidence in the case; which appeared to be uncritically accepted by 
the court.     
 
Psychiatrists and psychologists have come to rely upon the DSM terminology, 
notwithstanding its defects and difficulties, so as to give legitimacy and 
                                                        
31
 The actual formulation of the DSM IV is quoted (uncritically) in Re Alex [2004] FamCA 297, [101] 
within the evidence of English psychiatrist, “DR C”. Dr C appears from his evidence to espouse the 
generally conflictual pathological view of transsexualism, as he appears to see treatment to avert a young 
person’s transsexualism as an option.   
32
 Re Alex [2004] FamCA 297, [2]. 
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professional protection when diagnosing and treating transsexualism; especially in 
children. The reality is, however, that the truly important role performed by 
psychiatry and psychology in the medical treatment of transsexualism, in both 
adults and children, is to rule out disorder or illness as an explanation for the 
phenomenon. The psychiatric evidence in Re Kevin, for example, confirmed 
Kevin’s transsexualism by satisfying itself that his experience of himself as male in 
the face of the evidence to the contrary was not as a result of mental ill health, 
confusion or delusion.33 
 
The fact is that psychiatry, while ‘observing’ and interacting with transsexualism 
over many years, has never been able to either adequately explain or ‘cure’ it. The 
dominant role of the endocrinologist, rather than the psychiatrist, in the treatment of 
transsexualism has long been recognised. Given the serious and sometimes 
irreversible nature of sex affirmation treatment, it is necessary for psychiatry to play 
its role in limiting treatment for transsexualism to those who experience it and at the 
same time to assume more responsibility in the task of enabling all people with 
transsexualism (children and adults), their families and loved ones to experience the 
difference of transsexualism in a healthy way. 
  
The fact is that transsexualism should no longer be diagnosed and treated as if it 
were a mental illness or disorder. There is a developing campaign supported by 
diverse human rights groups, people with transsexualism and members of the 
medical and legal professions to remove transsexualism from the DSM as was done 
with homosexuality. Certainly, people with transsexualism will tell you they have 
never experienced Gender Dysphoria or any confusion about, or unhappiness with, 
either their gender or sexual identity. On the contrary, the experience of 
transsexualism (in the absence of any other phenomena or illness) is the experience 
of certainty and congruity as to both such identities in spite of all else. This is not to 
say that Gender Dysphoria and/or Gender Identity Disorder does not exist as a 
pathology or disorder. It is only to say that it is mistaken to include transsexualism 
within the same ambit.  
 
If there is dysphoria associated with the experience of transsexualism, it is the 
product, well known to many with disability, of the interaction between a person of 
difference and the culture expressed through conscious and unconscious prejudice.  
 
It is hard to better the clarity and detail of the discussion of the competing expert 
explanations for transsexualism, including the phenomena of the sexual 
differentiation of the human brain, carried out by Justice Richard Chisholm in his 
reasons and decision in Re Kevin.34 For convenience I set out his Honour’s primary 
conclusions in respect of that expert evidence in Appendix B which confirm and 
                                                        
33
 In Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074, Chisholm J quotes from the report Dr Cornelius Greenway at [46]:    
‘I do not believe that Kevin's perception of himself as a male is a result of a psychosis, nor of a 
delusional disorder. I do not believe that he is suffering from a body dysmorphic syndrome.’ 
34
 Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074, Chisholm J, particularly [239] to [264]. 
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explain the overwhelming dominance of the biological explanation of 
transsexualism in both medical science and the law. 
 
There will be no conclusive ‘scientific proof’ of the causation of transsexualism 
until medical science can identify and ratify the sexual differentiation of the human 
brain and/or genetic identifiers for transsexualism in living human beings.  
 
As the legal team in Re Kevin, Teresa Anderson and I did not set out to prove the 
biological/‘brain sex’ explanation of transsexualism, but to meet and overcome the 
so-called ‘biological/true sex’ genitocentric formula for determining the common 
law sex of an individual as established by Corbett. We sought to do this by showing 
that the psychological/disorder explanation for transsexualism, sustained more by 
prejudice, psychological practice and teaching than fact, was less likely to be true 
than the biological/‘brain sex’ one and that the decision of Corbett was 
fundamentally legally flawed. Once such propositions were accepted, it could 
follow quite simply and logically that the most likely explanation for transsexualism 
is that it is an intersexual condition; taking the human brain into equal account with 
other body parts. 
 
As Justice Chisholm commented: 
 
The traditional analysis that they are "psychologically" transsexual does 
not explain how this state came about.  For example, there seems to be no 
suggestion in the evidence that their psychological state can be explained 
by reference to circumstances of their upbringing.  In that sense, the brain 
sex theory does not seem to be competing with other explanations, but 
rather is providing a possible explanation of what is otherwise 
inexplicable.35 
 
And  
 
I have by no means quoted from or summarised the whole of the evidence 
before me.  However in my view it does, in the end, support the 
applicants' argument that it leads to a different view of transsexualism 
from the view that was manifested in Corbett.  For Ormrod J and for many 
of the experts at the time, transsexuals suffered from a discontinuity 
between their biology and their psychology, whereas intersexed people 
experienced inconsistencies within or among their biological qualities.  
But I am satisfied that the evidence now is inconsistent with the 
distinction formerly drawn between biological factors, meaning genitals, 
chromosomes and gonads, and merely "psychological factors", and on this 
basis distinguishing between cases of intersex (incongruities among 
                                                        
35
 Ibid [252]. 
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biological factors) and transsexualism (incongruities between biology and 
psychology).36  
 
 
And 
 
There is still doubt about precisely what characteristics of the brain are 
involved, how the development takes place, and the extent to which the 
development extends beyond the time of birth.  However, whatever the 
answers to these questions might prove to be, in my view the evidence 
demonstrates (at least on the balance of probabilities), that the 
characteristics of transsexuals are as much "biological" as those of people 
thought of as inter-sex. The difference is essentially that we can readily 
observe or identify the genitals, chromosomes and gonads, but at present 
we are unable to detect or precisely identify the equally "biological" 
characteristics of the brain that are present in transsexuals.37  
 
And finally 
 
In my view the evidence is, in essence, that the experts believe that the 
brain development view is likely to be true, and they explain the basis for 
their beliefs. In the circumstances, I see no reason why I should not accept 
the proposition, on the balance of probabilities, for the purpose of this 
case.38 
 
I quote these passages of the Re Kevin at length here, approved by the Full Court of 
the Family Court of Australia, as they dispose of the surprising proposition that the 
formal legal recognition of the biological nature of transsexualism is somehow 
either unattainable or unimportant and that ‘legal and social concepts of human 
rights’ provide a surer path to the attainment of legal and social recognition, 
legitimacy and equity.  
 
No decision of any superior court in the world has affirmed the human rights and 
the legitimacy of people living with transsexualism to the extent of the Re Kevin 
decisions.  
 
 
                                                        
36
 Ibid [270]. 
37
 Ibid [272]. 
38
 Ibid [248]. 
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V RE KEVIN 
 
The decisions in Re Kevin and the affirming decision of the Full Court of Family 
Court of Australia in Re Kevin-Full Court represent both a turning point, and a 
culmination, in the history of the development of the human rights of people living 
with transsexualism and their families; both in Australia and internationally.  
 
I said publicly at the time that the decisions demonstrated the significant capacity of 
the Australian justice system to embrace difference. In Re Kevin, the Applicant 
husband and wife successfully contended that, notwithstanding the husband’s 
transsexual background, the husband was entitled to be married as a man because 
he was a man within the meaning of that expression in s 46(1) of the Marriage Act 
and s 43 of the Family Law Act at the time of his marriage.  
 
Justice Chisholm's original decision, granting a Declaration of Validity of Marriage 
was delivered on 12th October 2001. The appeal before the Full Court of the Family 
Court of Australia was heard on 18th and 19th February 2002. The Full Court 
consisted of their Honours Chief Justice Nicholson and Justices Ellis and Brown. 
The Full Court of the Family Court of Australia delivered its decision on 21st 
February 2003. In its judgment, the Full Court dismissed the appeal by the Attorney 
General for the Commonwealth of Australian, thoroughly reviewed the applicable 
evidence and legal issues and strongly affirmed the original decision.  
 
Re Kevin declared the law of Australia to the effect that the question of whether a 
person is a man or a woman for the purpose of the marriage law of Australia is to be 
determined as at the date of the marriage, that there is no rule or presumption of 
Australian law that the question of whether a person is a man or a woman is to be 
determined by reference (only) to circumstances at the time of the person’s birth 
and that the answer to the question of whether an individual is a man or a woman 
for the purposes of the marriage law of Australia involves a subtle determination 
taking into account all the relevant sex differentiating facts and circumstances of the 
individual’s life. Anything to the contrary in the English decision of Corbett was 
declared not to represent Australian law.   
 
It was the primary contention of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth in the 
case that the question of whether a person is a man or a woman for the purposes of 
the marriage law of Australia should be determined pursuant to the reasoning and 
the test of the congruence of an individual's gonads, genitalia and chromosomal 
features (alone) as assessed at birth (only) as espoused in the judgment of His 
Honour Mr Justice Ormrod in Corbett. The Corbett decision also established the 
unfortunate legal precedent for treating people with transsexualism differently from 
those who experienced other types of intersexual conditions; even where the same 
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or similar life/human rights issues, such as the need for a declaration of the legal 
sex of an individual or the right of an individual to marry, were involved.39  
 
As was noted by the Full Court in Re Kevin, the expert evidence in that case, and 
most of the recent cases dealing with the issue world-wide, contradicted the mental 
illness/disorder/psychological explanation for transsexualism and supported the 
biological explanation. Such evidence also contradicted the Corbett distinction 
between so called ‘physical/genital intersex’ and ‘brain-body intersex’. The 2001 
English decision of W v W demonstrated the logical and ludicrous result of the 
continued legal application of that distinction; where aged shady memories of minor 
irregularities of infant genital formation, such as the size of genitalia, could 
determine whether or not an individual was to be legally characterised (or legally 
diagnosed) as experiencing either a genital/body intersexual condition or 
transsexualism and, hence, whether or not an individual could marry in her or his 
affirmed sex.   
 
In W v W the successful litigant, with an almost identical predicament to that of Mrs 
Bellinger, was successful in having her marriage declared valid in the United 
Kingdom, notwithstanding her genitalia were unambiguously male at birth and she 
possessed a ‘Y’ chromosome, because the evidence was that her male genitalia 
could be said to have been smaller than ‘the norm’ at birth and a medical expert was 
able to retrospectively (she had undergone Sex Affirmation Surgery) hypothesise 
that she could have experienced a degree of Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome and 
it could thus be hypothesised that she experienced a traditionally recognised 
‘intersex’ condition rather than transsexualism. I recall a news report at the time 
commented that in the case of W v W ‘…size really did matter’. I would not wish to 
be seen to be critical of Charles J who gave this decision. His Honour was bound by 
United Kingdom precedent to follow the decision of Corbett. Aided by intelligent 
submissions on behalf of Mrs W, Charles J merely sought and found a tortuous but 
humane way to save Mrs W from the application of the arbitrarily cruel Corbett 
dictum; which essentially established a form of biological apartheid which ensured 
that people with transsexualism who had undergone Sex Affirmation Treatment 
were unable to marry at all.  
 
Re Kevin has been relied upon in several landmark international decisions; 
including I v The United Kingdom and Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom, 
decided 11th July 2002 by the European Court of Human Rights. These decisions, 
which quote Justice Chisholm’s decision in Re Kevin at length and with approval, 
finally determined that there had been violations of articles 8, 12, 13 and 14 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 
respect of the legal status of people who had experienced transsexualism in the 
United Kingdom and, in particular, such people’s treatment in the spheres of 
employment, social security, pensions and marriage. As a result of these decisions 
                                                        
39
 See W v W [2001] 2 WLR 673 and Bellinger v Bellinger [2001] 2 FLR 1048, and the discussion of 
these judgments in the Re Kevin-Full Court decision. 
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the government of the United Kingdom introduced the Gender Recognition Act 
2004. 
 
The legal nexus between the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Re Kevin 
decisions really highlights the international interdependence of reform efforts in 
respect of the human rights of people with transsexualism. For reasons not 
altogether clear to me, the Re Kevin decisions seem to have received comparatively 
little favourable attention from activists for law reform for people living with 
transsexualism in the United Kingdom.  
 
While there are several aspects of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 which give rise 
to some considerable concern, such as the use of Gender Dysphoria and Gender 
Identity Disorder as qualifying concepts, the use of the concepts of "gender” and 
"acquired gender" and its treatment of marriage, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
is a tremendous achievement for all those who worked towards its introduction 
when one considers that the legislation emerged out of a totally unsupportive 
common law environment.  By way of contrast, and as is acknowledged by 
Chisholm J, Re Kevin and legislation throughout Australia dealing with the interests 
of people with transsexualism stand upon a solid common law foundation of cases 
and legal literature which have long rejected the Corbett approach and which had 
sought to deal with transsexualism in an inclusive and humane way.40 
 
Re Kevin was again relied upon in the landmark decision of the Sixth Judicial 
Circuit In And For Pasco County, Florida, in the United States of America in The 
Marriage of Kantaras.41At page 673 of his decision Justice O'Brien said: ‘…it is 
essential that Kevin (Re Kevin) not be given a mere "citation" but studied for what it 
represents in the law.  It is one of the most important cases on transsexualism to 
come on the scene of foreign jurisprudence.’    
 
The judgments in Re Kevin and Re Kevin-Full Court provide clear support for the 
proposition advanced by the expert evidence in the case that it is now reasonable to 
conclude the likelihood that, as for the animal brain, the human brain differentiates 
as to sex (female or male) in the same way as the other sexually differentiated 
features of the human body.42 That evidence and the findings expressed in both of 
                                                        
40
 The two leading cases are R v Harris and McGuinness (1988) 17 NSWLR 158 (NSW Court of 
Criminal Appeal) and Department of Social Security v SRA (1993) 118 ALR 467 (Full Court of Federal 
Court of Australia). 
41
 Case number 98-5375CA 511998DR00537WS. Kantaras has since been overturned on appeal and is 
likely to be the subject of a further appeal. 
42
 See Appendix C for a diagrammatic representation of the process derived from the evidence of 
Professor Gooren given in Re Kevin. The Full Court of the Family Court was satisfied, as was Chisholm 
J, that the scientific and medical evidence before the Court clearly showed that, on the balance of 
probability, transsexualism was to be regarded as a naturally occurring intersex condition properly and 
therapeutically treated by SAT (including SAS). For a detailed contemporary expert discussion of this 
subject, see Frank P M Kruijver, ‘Sex in the Brain’, a thesis conducted at the Netherlands Institute for 
Brain Research, Amsterdam, the Netherlands published October 2004 with the support of the 
Netherlands Institute for Brain Research.  
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these judgments in respect of the nature of transsexualism can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
• The phenomenon of transsexualism arises as a result of the once off sexual 
differentiation of the human brain that occurs at odds with the balance of 
the sexually differentiated features in the formation of a human being and 
is a natural variation in human sexual formation and not a mental illness or 
disorder; 
• Transsexualism is a form of intersex;43 
• An individual's brain sex differentiation, or neurological sex, can not be 
changed by means of psychotherapy and is 'hardwired'; 
• People with transsexualism self-diagnose their condition;44   
• Rather than diagnosing the condition of transsexualism, the important role 
played by psychiatry with regard to transsexualism is to ensure that people 
who experience mental disorders, such as delusional disorders, affecting 
gender identity, or who are transgender, do not receive sex affirmation 
treatment;45 
• The needs for sex affirmation and sex affirmation treatment by a person 
with transsexualism are not instances of desire or predilection, but rather 
are so compelling that the need to bring harmony between the life of 
sexual experience and the person’s brain sex means that people who 
experience transsexualism are prepared to risk everything, including their 
livelihood, their family connections and their health, by undergoing sex 
affirmation treatment in order to bring that harmony about; 
• That sex affirmation treatment, though including serious irreversible 
medical procedures, is rehabilitative for a person with transsexualism. 
Hence, the goal or purpose of sex affirmation treatment is not imitation of 
a cultural conception of the function or appearance of a perfect male or 
female body.  The goal or purpose of sex affirmation treatment is the 
attainment of sexual unity and comfort by the person with 
transsexualism46. 
  
The Full Court affirmed Chisholm J’s approach in Re Kevin to the determination of 
the common law sex of a person for the purpose of marriage.  His Honour’s 
judgment set out a broad and undefined range of both biological and cultural 
characteristics of a person that should be taken into account in ascertaining the 
                                                        
43
 See Re Kevin-Full Court  [2003] FamCA 94, [326] and post. 
44
 This statement was also confirmed by Dr Russell Reid in his address at the 2004 Gendys Conference 
in the United Kingdom; 
45
 See Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 94, [43] - [46]. 
46
 For a number of reasons set out in expert evidence, and in the husband’s evidence, such as medical 
risk, present efficacy, cost and family obligation, Kevin, like many males experiencing transsexualism, 
had not undergone phalloplasty (penile construction) at the time of the hearing.  The husband was still 
considered by the expert opinion, and the Respondent/Appellant, to have successfully undergone 
complete irreversible sex affirmation treatment; sufficient to permit medical certification pursuant to 
sections 32B and 32C of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW). 
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person’s common law sex47. Although his Honour cautioned that no list could be 
definitive, he highlighted the following aspects of a person as being the primary 
factors to be taken into account in such determination: 
 
• the person's biological and physical characteristics at birth (including 
gonads, genitals and chromosomes);  
• the person's life experiences, including the sex in which he or she is 
brought up and the person's attitude to it; 
• the person's self-perception as a man or woman;  
• the extent to which the person has functioned in society as a man or a 
woman; 
• any hormonal, surgical or other medical aspects of sex affirmation 
treatment the person has undergone and the consequences of such 
treatment; 
• the person's biological, psychological and physical characteristics at the 
time of the marriage, including (if they can be identified) any biological 
features of the person's brain that are associated with a particular sex.  
 
At the same time, his Honour acknowledged that people with transsexualism who 
had undergone sex affirmation surgery would normally be considered as members 
of their affirmed sex at common law; whether or not their legal sex had been 
reassigned under State law. 
 
It is possible to distil the following further principles from the Re Kevin decisions: 
 
1. A person with transsexualism who has undergone irreversible sex 
affirmation treatment will normally be considered a member of their 
affirmed sex at common law; 
2. Sex affirmation surgery does not have to meet any predetermined 
standards of either appearance or function in order to be considered 
'successful' or to have occurred.  The purpose of sex affirmation treatment 
(and sex affirmation surgery) is rehabilitative and for the benefit of the 
individual or subject, rather than imitative and for the benefit of the culture 
or observer; 
3. The task of the law in determining the sex of a person for the purpose of 
marriage (and otherwise) is not that of determining the person's 'true sex' 
or predominant biological sex, but rather the sex, male or female, into 
which the person best fits having regard to the sexually differentiated 
characteristics of the person, the person's ability to function and live in 
either sex, the person's gender expression as well as cultural expectations 
of what it means to be a man/male or a woman/female person; 
4. Australian culture conceives of people who have undergone irreversible 
sex affirmation treatment (including genital surgery) as being of their 
affirmed sex;48 
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5. The question of the validity of a marriage is to be determined having 
regard to the various factors to be taken into account, including the sex of 
each of the parties to the marriage, at the time of the marriage (and not 
otherwise). 
 
 
VI RE KEVIN AS PART OF A COMMON LAW HERITAGE  
 
Prior to the Re Kevin decisions, any discussion of the right of a person with 
transsexualism to marry, or to be legally recognised in accordance with their 
affirmed sex, would have begun with, or focused upon, the decision of Corbett.  As 
demonstrated by Chisholm J in Re Kevin, however, Corbett did not actually 
represent either the orthodox or traditional common law opinion or position on the 
subject.  The judgment of one of the earliest cases, In Re Leber (Switz-c1946) (‘Re 
Leber’), establishes a tradition or approach, which I call "Inclusive", and which is 
consistent with Re Kevin, rather than Corbett, when it states  
 
This inclines us to attribute to the psychic element, in the determination of sex, 
an importance at least equal to that of the physical element…It is not only the 
body which determines the sex of the individual, it is also the mind. When there 
is a discord between body and mind, one must see which of these two elements 
predominates. Leber…must be placed in the category of human beings, which 
he most resembles.49 
 
It is that tradition, which seeks to include people with the intersexual difference of 
transsexualism into the legal world of male and female according to their affirmed 
neurological sex, that was maintained by Judge Pecora in the American decision of 
Re Anonymous50 where his Honour states 
 
The Court is cognisant of the fact that the transsexual, anatomically, does 
not present the same problem as that of the pseudo-hermaphrodite. His 
social sex is determined by his anatomical sex. But again, by definition, 
his psychological sex, as distinguished from his anatomical sex, is that of 
the opposite sex.  Absent surgical intervention, there is no question that 
his social sex must conform with his anatomical sex, his mental attitude 
notwithstanding. But once surgical intervention has taken place, whereby 
his anatomical sex is made to conform with his psychological sex, is not 
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his position identical to that of the pseudo-hermaphrodite who has been 
surgically repaired?  Should not society afford some measure of 
recognition to the altered situation and afford this individual the same 
relief as it does the pseudo-hermaphrodite?51 
 
In these circumstances, it is the decision of Corbett which takes a different and 
radical position in which Ormrod J, the medically qualified judge, brings his 
particular and strongly held views on biology and homosexuality to bear on the 
subject of transsexualism. As discussed and confirmed in both the Re Kevin 
decisions, Ormrod J’s judgment lacks a cohesive logic and selectively adopts and 
rejects the expert evidence before him in order to create a narrow pseudo biological 
test so as to determine the 'true sex' of a person with transsexualism (only). Justice 
Ormrod is able to specifically preclude a person of transsexual background, and not 
a person with genital intersex, from marrying in their affirmed sex, by limiting the 
application of his pseudo biological test to the time of the birth event. One piece of 
evidence his Honour was obliged to exclude was the evidence that people with 
transsexualism experienced an intersexual condition.  This pseudo 'biological test' is 
expressed by Justice Ormrod in this famous quotation from his decision: 
 
…the criteria must, in my judgment, be biological, for even the most 
extreme degree of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal 
imbalance which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male 
gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally 
capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.52 
 
A characteristic of most of the cases that follow and adopt the Corbett pseudo 
‘biological’ test, other than because of precedent, such as the decision of the Texas 
Court of Appeals in Littleton v. Prange,53 is their uncritical acceptance of the 
certainty and correctness of the Corbett approach; essentially based upon the 
proposition that transsexualism is a form of mental ill-health or psychological 
disorder.  I describe the approach therein adopted as the “Exclusive” approach.   
 
It is possible to identify a version or variation of this approach, which is still 
fundamentally based on a belief in the ‘disorder model’ of transsexualism, 
evidenced by Littleton as well as by the majority decisions in United Kingdom case 
of Bellinger54 from the original trial, through the Court of Appeal, to the House of 
Lords.  This sub-group, which I describe as ultimately adopting the "Exclusive-but-
Too Difficult-Anyway” approach, sometimes begin their decisions appearing to be 
Inclusive, but then politely question how a human being can actually "change the 
sex they are born with" and ultimately reach a decision denying inclusive rights to 
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people living with transsexualism; by first reciting a number of legal and social 
difficulties which they foresee would occur if they were to follow the inclusive path 
and then by reciting the litany that courts should leave such matters to the decision 
of Parliament. Such decisions recite this formula notwithstanding that they discuss, 
and rely upon, the decision of Corbett in which Ormrod J was more than happy to 
make a decision in respect of the same subject matter without reference to 
Parliament and saw clearly that it was the precise obligation of the Court to do so 
where Parliament had not prescribed otherwise within the relevant legislation; here 
the respective Marriage Acts.  This is essentially the approach taken by the District 
Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, in its decision reversing the trial 
decision of Justice O'Bryan in Kantaras.55 
 
While the 1995 New Zealand decision Attorney-General v Otahuhu Family Court 56 
and the 2002 decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in I v The United 
Kingdom and Christine Goodwin v The United Kingdom reject the Corbett approach 
and determine that post-operative or surgically affirmed people with transsexualism 
should be able to marry in their affirmed sex, they do so without resolving the 
question of the causation of transsexualism and thus without providing any 
legitimacy for people with transsexualism in their affirmation of their sex.  These 
decisions are based instead on a practical acceptance of the fact of sex affirmation 
surgery and the existence of people with transsexualism.  They could be called the 
"Social Justice” cases. Although Chisholm J expressly acknowledged that he was 
not primarily relying upon his findings in respect of the nature of transsexualism in 
reaching his decision, he did seek to incorporate an appreciation of transsexualism 
within his decision rather than to disregard the issue or assign its resolution to some 
time in the future when medical science had placed the issue beyond doubt.  
 
Apart from the first instance decision of Kantaras, the recent decision which most 
resembles the approach taken in the Re Kevin decisions is that of the Court of 
Appeal of the State of Kansas, in Estate of Gardiner57 where the Court also sought 
to pick up the inclusive approach pioneered in Re Leber and Re Anonymous-1968 
by seeking to explore contemporaneous expert evidence concerning the sexual 
differentiation and formation of human beings so as to seek to ground the legal 
decision concerning the right of people with transsexualism to claim the legal sex 
they affirm in reference to medical science and the experience of people with 
transsexuals in contrast to the blinkered certainty of the Exclusive-but-Too-Difficult-
Anyway approach.  As discussed in the Re Kevin-Full Court judgment, once the 
connection between transsexualism and other intersexual conditions is 
acknowledged, the United Kingdom decision of Charles J in W v W can be 
appreciated as fitting squarely within the Inclusive line of cases. 
 
The heritage of Australian decisions in respect of transsexualism, namely Harris 
and McGuinness and SRA, shows the evolutionary connection between the Social 
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Justice and Inclusive decisions which preceded, and enabled, the Re Kevin 
decisions. 
 
The common ground shared by the Social Justice and Inclusive cases is the 
requirement that a person living with transsexualism must first have physically 
affirmed their sex by way of undergoing irreversible sex affirmation treatment 
(including surgery) before that person can be legally recognised as being of the 
person's affirmed sex; although the Re Kevin and the Kantaras (first instance) 
decisions give a new and more humane meaning to that surgical requirement. While 
some remain critical of any surgical requirement, and while I believe legislation 
should provide for a compassionate exception to that requirement where age or 
health mean the undergoing of such treatment/surgery is impossible, I otherwise 
recognise that if people living with transsexualism desire full legal recognition in 
their affirmed sex, then they are obliged to recognise the need to fulfil minimal 
cultural expectations in respect of the different strength and sexual capacity of male 
and female bodies.  It is one thing to have a right; but it is another equally important 
thing to have that right culturally received and acknowledged. Subject to the proper 
funding of sex affirmation treatment by the state, those people with transsexualism 
who are able to undergo such treatment will do so irrespective of the law. 
 
VII THE DECISION IN RE ALEX 
 
 
 
As I am unable to find a sensible place for this case within any of the lines of cases 
discussed above, and given the particular importance of the rights of children living 
with transsexualism, I will give this case special treatment. 
 
At the same time, I do not intend to introduce into the discussion of this case issues 
concerning Australia's international treaty obligations in respect of children's rights, 
but rather to critique the decision within the same parameters as have been applied 
to the discussion of other decisions within this article.  That is not to say, however, 
that such international children's rights considerations are not relevant to a 
consideration of Nicholson CJ's judgement in Re Alex. 
 
Re Alex dealt with the issue of the right of an adolescent to obtain medical treatment 
for transsexualism.  Such an issue poses a number of legal and ethical issues 
because of the competing interests of the various stakeholders.58 Such stakeholders 
include the child or adolescent, the child or adolescent’s parents or guardians, the 
treating physician/s as well as the state (or culture).59  
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In Re Alex the Family Court of Australia was thus obliged to ascertain and reflect a 
number of stakeholder interests in circumstances where those interests were subject 
to the changing perceptions and sensibilities of Australian culture and medical 
science in respect of transsexualism. Those primary interests can be identified as 
individual privacy, the rights of children and adolescents to autonomy in respect of 
sexual identity and medical treatment, the rights of parents to determine the welfare 
of their children and, in particular, the medical treatment to be afforded to their 
children and the right of the state, acting through the court, to protect children and 
adolescents in respect of certain special medical procedures which the court finds 
that children should not undertake without the court having first assessed the best 
interests of the child or adolescent on a case-by-case basis. 
 
At the time of the hearing, Alex was a 13 year old asserting and affirming his male 
sex notwithstanding that he possessed a female anatomy and had been originally 
assigned to the female legal sex. The evidence was that Alex was sane and did not 
experience a disorder (other than transsexualism as therein characterised), had long 
sustained a consistent male sex affirmation and was properly diagnosed as 
experiencing transsexualism. This was made clear notwithstanding the dominance 
of psychiatric pathological terminology in the case. Surprisingly, in one of only two 
cursory references to Re Kevin in the decision, his Honour represents Re Kevin as 
authority for the proposition that the causation of transsexualism is uncertain.60 
 
Regrettably, given the expert evidence and findings of Kevin, the expert evidence 
adduced in respect of transsexualism in Re Alex was limited to psychiatric opinion 
which adhered to the psychiatric/disorder model or explanation of transsexualism. 
That anachronistic perception of transsexualism dominates Re Alex from the very 
title of the case to the lengthy and misconceived public policy pronouncements 
concerning the law in respect of the re-assignment of legal sex as determined by 
birth certificate legislation with which it ends. 
 
The reasoning of the decision, its legal and public policy ramifications and its 
treatment outcome for Alex give rise to considerable concern. Re Alex is a useful 
lesson for those dealing with issues of difference in legal proceedings. The concepts 
of the biological/intersexual model of transsexualism and the fallibility of the 
method we use to allocate legal sex in our culture, though previously individually 
touched upon, were clarified in the Re Kevin decisions as a result of the breadth, 
quality and interdisciplinary character of the expert evidence adduced in that case. 
Further, Re Kevin can be distinguished as a case in which people living with 
transsexualism were advised and represented by people living with transsexualism. 
A legal representative living with transsexualism should be better able to advocate 
the experience of transsexualism with clarity and conviction in the face of mixed or 
contrary expert opinion and cultural prejudice, ignorance and/or confusion in 
respect of the phenomenon. 
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The difference in the expert evidence and submissions concerning transsexualism in 
Re Kevin and Re Alex is important to the ultimate decision in Re Alex because the 
court findings as to the nature of transsexualism in childhood and adolescence, and 
hence the nature of the medical treatment for the condition, were crucial to the 
court’s findings that Alex could not have the personal capacity to understand and 
consent to that treatment and that the treatment itself was a special medical 
procedure to which Alex’s guardian was unable to consent; giving jurisdiction to 
the court in respect of the authorisation of such medical treatment. In so doing, the 
court assigned the treatment of transsexualism in adolescence to the same category 
as sterilisation for the mentally ill child and other such procedures, which have no 
therapeutic benefit for the young person concerned and thus present the possibility 
of a parent/child conflict of interest. 
 
In Re Alex, the court reached the view that Alex should receive only some of the 
medical treatment he requested for his transsexualism because, as he suffered from 
“Gender Dysphoria/GID” as described by “Dr C”, there was a reasonable chance 
that he would not go on to experience transsexualism as an adult. Notwithstanding, 
the court, even on an interim basis, permitted Alex to publicly affirm his sex and 
live his life, including attending school, as a young adolescent male. At the same 
time the court limited the treatment options open to Alex’s treating doctors 
necessary to enable him do so with anything other than a neo-pubertal female body. 
Further, the orders ultimately made by Nicholson CJ appear to anticipate the 
ongoing participation of the court in decision-making concerning Alex’s ongoing 
medical treatment until adulthood utilising the Child Representative. It is difficult to 
find the justification for the costs incurred by this ongoing intrusion by the court 
into Alex’s medical treatment, or to imagine individual parents, or legal aid, footing 
the bill for such ongoing legal participation in medical treatment decisions for every 
young person in Australia requiring treatment for transsexualism. One only has to 
review Kevin’s evidence in Re Kevin concerning the agony of adolescence for a 
young person with transsexualism to imagine the unnecessary difficulties and pain 
this tentative, complex, costly and delay-prone approach to the treatment of 
transsexualism in adolescence must deliver to Alex.  
 
Although a pre-eminent treatment centre for children with transsexualism has 
existed in the Netherlands for some years, where treatment for transsexualism in 
childhood and adolescence is part of an established and monitored program, no 
evidence from that treatment centre was produced for Re Alex. If such evidence and 
the evidence of the routine non-surgical treatment of other children with intersexual 
conditions had been before the court in Re Alex there must be doubt that the court 
could have found either Alex’s request for treatment for transsexualism, or the 
treatment itself, ‘novel’.61 This statement or conclusion is also hard to reconcile 
with the fact his Honour should have been aware that “Dr C” had treated a 
considerable number of young people in respect of transsexualism in the United 
Kingdom.  
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I have already received instructions from parents of a 12 year old affirmed female 
with transsexualism in New South Wales who must now deal with the 
determination of NSW Health that the decision in Re Alex requires that her parents 
obtain the approval of the Family Court of Australia for the medical treatment she 
promptly requires when, prior to that decision, no such court approval was 
necessary and the treatment had been medically approved in accordance with the 
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW). I am 
instructed that there are several other young people and their families similarly 
adversely affected by the Re Alex decision in New South Wales alone. As the 
effects of shame and cultural prejudice subside, it is likely more young people with 
transsexualism will be able to access help and medical treatment with the 
assistance, approval and support of their families and the community. I submit that 
it is neither good medical practice, humane (to the child and her or his family) nor 
good public policy that the medical treatment of each such child or young person be 
subject to the delay, worry and cost of obtaining the approval of the Family Court 
of Australia. The additional financial and other impositions involved in the process 
of court approval are likely to result in further professional reluctance to diagnose, 
and further parental resistance to both diagnosis and treatment. 
 
In Re Kevin and Re Alex it could be said that the Family Court of Australia has now 
apparently accepted two conflicting explanations for transsexualism. On another 
view, Re Alex demonstrates the misconceived differentiation between 
transsexualism in childhood/adolescence and in adults that is evidenced in the 
DSM. In my opinion Re Alex should be distinguished, and the explanation of 
transsexualism in Re Kevin preferred for all who experience it, in circumstances 
where the quality and breadth of the expert evidence relied upon in Re Alex is 
questionable and the fact that such expert evidence does not appear to have been 
challenged or tested in the particular circumstances, and management, of that case. 
There also appears to have been a failure of adequate submissions dealing with a 
number of issues as commented upon by his Honour in the judgment or as 
otherwise referred to herein.  Moreover, the judgment in Re Alex takes on the 
demeanour of reformist zeal in arguing in favour of the abandonment of the 
requirement of sex affirmation treatment as a precondition of the reassignment of 
legal sex.  In doing so, the court may have adopted the transgender perspective that 
sex affirmations surgery is an optional choice for people living with transsexualism 
rather than the essential medical treatment that it is. 
 
My contentions in respect of the legal aspects of the decision in Re Alex grounding 
jurisdiction can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. The decision was given per incuriam in that, in circumstances where there is 
a significant difference of expert opinion in respect of the nature of 
transsexualism in childhood/adolescence (as to whether it is a natural 
intersexual variation in human sexual formation as found in Re Kevin62 in 
respect of transsexualism generally or whether it is a mental illness, 
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psychological disturbance, disorder or state of mental confusion), his Honour 
only had the benefit of limited expert opinion of a psychiatric nature which 
only informed the court of one these opinions in circumstances where: 
 
1.1 Such expert opinion was crucial to the court’s categorisation 
of the phenomenon of transsexualism in 
childhood/adolescence and the categorisation of its medical 
treatment and hence the court’s decision as whether such 
treatment had, or had not, a therapeutic purpose as well as 
whether such medical treatment was, or was not, intended for 
the benefit of the child/adolescent; 
  
1.2 The expert evidence before the court in Re Alex in respect of 
the nature and (certainty of) diagnosis of transsexualism in 
childhood/adolescence was essentially in conflict with 
common sense and the extensive expert evidence and 
findings of the Re Kevin decisions.  
 
1.3 The limited and arguably inadequate nature of the expert 
evidence as to the phenomenon of transsexualism in 
childhood and adolescence, its diagnosis and its medical 
treatment upon which the court relied in Re Alex brings into 
question the courts determination of its jurisdiction in the 
case.  
 
2. The Court’s significant jurisdiction to usurp the power of a child’s 
parents/guardian in respect of the authorisation of medical treatment is not 
exercised or invoked lightly or for every medical treatment or procedure that 
has irreversible and possibly dire consequences. The principles, which the 
court in Re Alex purports to follow, were set out by the High Court 
concerning the Family Court’s child welfare/parens patriae powers in 
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SWB.63 
That case involved the sterilisation of an intellectually disabled 
child/adolescent where the sole or predominant purpose of the medical 
procedure in question was the young person’s sterilisation. 
 
3. In Marion’s Case, the High Court went to some length to stress that its 
decision did not mean that the power of a parent or guardian to authorise 
medical treatment for a child was usurped by the court where sterilisation (or 
any other ‘invasive, permanent and irreversible medical treatment’) was a 
likely or possible by-product of medical treatment carried out for a 
therapeutic purpose.  To be a special medical procedure, the medical 
procedure or treatment involved had to have the special character of having 
no therapeutic benefit for the child or young person receiving it; 
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4. At paragraph 152 and following of the judgment in Re Alex, his Honour 
confirmed that if the Family Court were to have jurisdiction in respect of the 
Re Alex proceedings, the court first had to determine whether Alex had 
capacity to consent to such procedure himself (as per the Gillick Test64).  If 
Alex had that capacity, the Family Court had no jurisdiction in the case. His 
Honour then confirmed that, in the event that Alex did not have that capacity, 
the Family Court would only have jurisdiction in the case if the proposed 
medical procedure was a Special Medical Procedure as defined in Marion's 
Case. If Alex had capacity to consent and/or the proposed procedure was not 
a Special Medical Procedure, then the court had no jurisdiction.  
 
5. At paragraph 153 of the Re Alex decision his Honour extracted the gravamen 
of Marion’s Case in respect of the determination of when a medical 
procedure is special in so far as normal parental consent is ineffective or 
insufficient consent as being when the proposed medical procedure: 
 
5.1 Is invasive, permanent and irreversible; and 
5.2 Is not for the purpose of curing a malfunction or disease. 
 
6. With the respect due to his Honour, I contend there was error in applying the 
principles referred to above, and in Marion's Case, in respect of the 
determination of Alex’s capacity to consent (particularly at paragraphs 157 to 
173) when he finds that although Alex apparently passes the Gillick test of 
personal understanding/appreciation and/or capacity, the nature of the ‘sex 
change’ procedure is such that no child/adolescent could have the requisite 
capacity to consent to such treatment. While it is contended that his Honour’s 
judgment on this issue must have been influenced by the limited evidence 
which dominated Re Alex concerning transsexualism in childhood, its 
diagnosis and treatment, it is wrong to apply the principles espoused both in 
Marion’s Case and the Gillick test to the determination of the question of 
Alex’s personal capacity to consent, by transforming the personal nature of 
that assessment to one applicable to any and all children/adolescents in 
respect of the medical treatment of transsexualism. 
 
7. I also question the finding of his Honour at paragraphs 174 through to 200 
that the treatment for Alex’s transsexualism (referred to misleadingly and 
anachronistically as ‘sex change’) was not for the purpose of curing a 
malfunction or disease (ie was not therapeutic). Thus, his Honour 
characterised treatment for transsexualism in childhood/adolescence as the 
same as medical treatment carried out with the purpose of sterilising a child; 
where the consent of a parent was insufficient due to a possible conflict of 
interest between parent and child. 
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8. The literature on the subject indicates that the earlier people (especially 
children/adolescents with transsexualism) receive treatment the better the 
chances of the success of such treatment and the better the overall quality of 
their lives.65 Evidence of the existence of an urgent need for Alex to receive 
treatment was before his Honour. Thus, I believe there was a failure in the 
decision to take account of the financial, emotional and child welfare 
implications of the decision on the parents of children/adolescents with 
transsexualism; and hence the adverse affect of the decision upon 
children/adolescence with transsexualism themselves in likely limiting and 
delaying their opportunity and access to treatment. These were 
considerations clearly present in the decision of the High Court in Marion’s 
case which led that court to so limit the medical treatment that could be 
classified or categorised as a Special Medical Procedure and which should 
have led his Honour in Re Alex to find that the treatment of transsexualism in 
childhood/adolescence was not. 
 
Notwithstanding my criticism of the decision in Re Alex, the fundamental goodwill 
and open-mindedness exhibited by Nicholson CJ is the distinguishing characteristic 
of our Australian justice system that enables it to deal so well with diversity and 
which provides its capacity to facilitate cultural maturation. The errors, which I 
contend are present in the decision, indicate, however, that special considerations 
are required when having difference on trail if we are to do justice to minorities 
within our culture.  
 
It is therefore important to emphasise that my criticism of the evidence, submissions 
and the decision of the Family Court of Australia in Re Alex neither makes or 
implies a criticism of the medical experts and lawyers who participated in those 
proceedings. Indeed, the goodwill, earnest intent and efforts of those people to seek 
and obtain a result in the case that honoured Alex and was in his best interests is 
abundantly clear.  There was no conscious or individual prejudice at work in Re 
Alex that could be held responsible for the error of the decision in that case. There is 
prejudice in Re Alex, but being cultural prejudice it is so deep-rooted, self-
reinforcing, almost ‘natural’ and pervasive that its presence is camouflaged. The 
responsibility for that prejudice belongs to us all, is cultural, and is the product of 
the difficulties to be met when the law seeks to deal with an unusual aspect of 
ourselves that we have long sought out of fear to deny; in this case transsexualism. 
 
VIII CONCLUSION 
 
Re Kevin is the clear statement of Australian common law confirming the method of 
the determination of the sex of an individual who has experienced the intersex 
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condition of transsexualism for the purpose of marriage. The decision continues and 
expresses a long international common law tradition of cases dealing with 
transsexualism in a culturally inclusive way. In its expert and detailed exploration 
of transsexualism as an example of the human condition, it is a general teaching, as 
much as a legal judgment, and represents the foundation of a new era in human 
rights for people who experience a phenomenon which has been so mystified and 
misunderstood.  Re Kevin is also an evidentiary blueprint to those representing 
people living with transsexualism (and other aspects of difference); and particularly 
in cases where regard may be had to the cultural perception of people with 
transsexualism and/or statutory interpretation requiring the determination of the 
ordinary, everyday meaning of words in legislation.  
 
Re Kevin is a credit to the courage and determination of the applicants, ‘Kevin’ and 
‘Jennifer’ and the workings of Australian justice that enabled them to succeed 
against a committed Commonwealth government to establish a true ‘landmark’ in 
the movement for equal civil rights for people living with transsexualism. The 
considerable lay evidence of ‘Kevin’s’ acceptance as a man in Australian culture 
and the overwhelmingly positive acceptance of the decision is a welcome reminder 
of the intrinsic compassion of Australians and our desire and capacity to give the 
‘underdog’ a go. 
 
Re Kevin confirms the Australian cultural acceptance and appreciation of diversity 
or difference in human sexual formation.  The decision confirms the expert opinion 
that biological sex is multi-dimensional and is ultimately determined by the sexual 
differentiation of the human brain rather than by body parts such as external 
genitalia.  It is now clear that a person’s legal sex (as per their birth certificate) can 
be different from their predominant biological or innate sex (as per their 'brain sex') 
as well as their common law sex as determined by a court. Our society has now 
begun to understand transsexualism and some other traditionally known intersex 
conditions, to appreciate the life experience of the people who live with these 
conditions and that such conditions are nothing more or less than natural variations 
in human sexual formation. 
 
Is now possible to distinguish an individual's gender expression (or gender identity) 
from the individual's sex (or sexual identity) and to appreciate that both are 
different again from an individual’s sexuality as indicated by the terms 
"homosexual", "bisexual" and "heterosexual".  In so doing it is easier to understand 
the essential need of an individual who experiences transsexualism to affirm his or 
her innate sex by undergoing conclusive sex affirmation procedures and then to 
have his or her legal sex reassigned to secure the issue of an appropriate birth 
certificate to secure the right of accurate non-discriminatory identity and full 
uncompromised legal rights in the individual's reassigned legal sex in congruity 
with the affirmed sex and sexually rehabilitated/harmonised body. The need for 
uniform State and Territory legislation guaranteeing these fundamental human 
rights is now clear and yet no such uniform legislation exists. 
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As people with transsexualism have been increasingly ‘reading themselves aloud’66 
over the past decade, and as transsexualism has increasingly been recognised in 
Australia and elsewhere as a biologically derived intersexual condition with an 
established diagnosis and treatment regime, the demands have intensified for the 
full recognition of the fundamental human rights of people who experience 
transsexualism such as the right: 
 
• to be diagnosed as experiencing transsexualism and treated without being 
medically classified as suffering a mental illness or disorder such as 
Gender Dysphoria and Gender Identity Disorder;  
• to be accorded equality of legal rights with others who experience 
intersexual conditions in respect of access to medical treatment and the re-
assignment or correction of an individual’s legal sex; 
• of children and adolescents with transsexualism (and their parents) to 
receive personal, medical and legal support for the affirmation of their 
innate sex so as to be able upon diagnosis to promptly (without court 
approval) undergo various non-surgical aspects of sex affirmation 
treatment so as to forestall the development of inappropriate and harmful 
secondary sexual characteristics and to enable such children to experience 
their adolescence with physical characteristics appropriate to their 
affirmed sex; 
•  to receive medical treatment for the condition funded by the state as for 
any other critical medical condition; 
•  of a person of transsexual background (one who has undergone 
irreversible sex affirmation treatment so as to physically affirm her or his 
sex) to have that person’s legal sex altered so as to accurately reflect that 
person's physically affirmed sex and sexual identity without the 
precondition of having to end an existing marriage and so as to provide 
for full and unconditionally equal rights in the individual’s affirmed sex; 
• of a person with transsexualism who, as a result of age or health, is unable 
to undergo complete irreversible sex affirmation treatment, to be assessed 
by an expert panel and, in appropriate circumstances, to be permitted the 
reassignment of legal sex on a compassionate and/or provisional basis; 
•  of a person of transsexual background to participate in competitive sport 
in the person’s affirmed sex; and 
•  of a person of transsexual background to otherwise have the right to live a 
full and fulfilling life in the person’s physically affirmed sex on the same 
terms as others of that sex in respect of such issues as superannuation and 
other forms of insurance without discrimination.  
 
I am a believer in the maxim that the degradation of the existence of the least of us 
degrades the existence of us all. We can each have more meaningful and proactive 
lives through our everyday dealings with each other by showing the kind of 
understanding and acceptance of difference and imperfection in the people we meet 
                                                        
66
 Stone, above n 3, 299. 
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that will help create a world in which we can be comfortable with our own.  The 
creation of beauty out of imperfection is, after all, our human heritage. 
 
Transsexualism is a profound example of human difference that has the power to 
teach us about our relationship with difference per se.  The recognition of the 
human rights of people living with transsexualism calls upon us to reach out with an 
open mind in order to stake our claim in own humanity through the appreciation of 
human lives so different from our own.  I am convinced that our own lives become 
richer through this reception of the lives of our brothers and sisters in difference and 
that it is this capacity for the reception and appreciation of difference that is the way 
forward that the people of our planet must take in order to prevail. These sentiments 
reflect those embodied in the words of author and United Nations Undersecretary-
General for Communications and Public Information, Shashi Tharoor, when he said  
 
If the 20th Century can be said to be the one in which the world was made 
safe for democracy, let it be said that the 21st Century was the one in which 
the world was made safe for diversity.67 
 
 
                                                        
67
 Based upon the author’s notes of a ABC Radio National interview conducted by Shashi Tharoor 
broadcast in about January 2003.   
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IX APPENDIX A 
 
 
DIFFERENCE AND FOREGOING PASSING - Circa 1991 
 
Transsexuals who pass seem to be able to ignore the fact that by creating 
totalised, monistic identities, foregoing physical and subjective 
intertextuality, they have foreclosed the possibility of authentic 
relationships.  Under the principle of passing, denying the destabilising 
power of being "read", relationships begin as lies - and passing, of course, 
is not an activity restricted to transsexuals.  This is familiar to the person 
of color whose skin is light enough to pass as white, or to the closet gay or 
lesbian ... or to anyone who has chosen invisibility as an imperfect 
solution to personal dissonance… I could not ask a transsexual for 
anything more inconceivable than to forego passing, to be consciously 
"read", to read oneself aloud - and by this troubling and productive 
reading, to begin to write oneself into the discourses by which one has 
been written - in effect, then, to become a (look out - dare I say it again?) 
posttranssexual…*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
* (an extract from) Sandy Stone, ‘A Post transsexual Manifesto’, in Julia 
Epstein and Kristina Straub (Eds) Body Guards (1991) 298-9.  
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X APPENDIX B 
 
 
Re Kevin – Significant findings of Justice Richard Chisholm in respect of the 
expert medical evidence in that case as to the causation of transsexualism 
and as strongly affirmed by the Full Court on appeal 
 
At paragraph [247]:  ‘In my view the expert evidence in this case affirms that brain 
development is (at least) an important determinant of a person’s sense of being a 
man or a woman. No contrary opinion is expressed. All the experts are very well 
qualified. None was required for cross-examination, nor was any contrary evidence 
called’. 
 
At paragraph [248]:  ‘In my view the evidence is, in essence, that the experts 
believe that the brain development view is likely to be true, and they explain the 
basis for their beliefs. In the circumstances, I see no reason why I should not accept 
the proposition, on the balance of probabilities, for the purpose of this case.’ 
 
At paragraph [252]: ‘The traditional analysis that they are "psychologically" 
transsexual does not explain how this state came about.  For example, there seems 
to be no suggestion in the evidence that their psychological state can be explained 
by reference to circumstances of their upbringing.  In that sense, the brain sex 
theory does not seem to be competing with other explanations, but rather is 
providing a possible explanation of what is otherwise inexplicable’. 
 
At paragraph [253]:  ‘In other words (as I understand it) the brain of an individual 
may in some sense be male, for example, though the rest of the person’s body is 
female’. 
 
At paragraph [265]: ‘In my view the argument in favour of the “brain sex" view is 
also based on evidence about the development and experience of transsexuals and 
others with atypical sex-related characteristics.  There is a vast literature on this, 
some of which is in evidence, and I can do no more than mention briefly some of 
the main points’. 
 
At paragraph [268]:  ‘It seems quite wrong to think of these people as merely 
wishing or preferring to be of the opposite sex, or having the opinion that they are’. 
 
At paragraph [270]: ‘But I am satisfied that the evidence now is inconsistent with 
the distinction formerly drawn between biological factors, meaning genitals, 
chromosomes and gonads, and merely "psychological factors", and on this basis 
distinguishing between cases of inter-sex (incongruities among biological factors) 
and transsexualism (incongruities between biology and psychology)’. 
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At paragraph [272]: ‘In my view the evidence demonstrates (at least on the balance 
of probabilities) that the characteristics of transsexuals are as much “biological” as 
those of people thought of as inter-sex’. 
 
At paragraph [136]: ‘I agree with Ms Wallbank that in the present context the word 
"man" should be given its ordinary contemporary meaning. In determining that 
meaning, it is relevant to have regard to many things that were the subject of 
evidence and submissions. They include the context of the legislation, the body of 
case law on the meaning of "man" and similar words, the purpose of the legislation, 
and the current legal, social and medical environment. These matters are considered 
in the course of the judgment.  I believe that this approach is in accordance with 
common sense, principles of statutory interpretation, and with all or virtually all of 
the authorities in which the issue of sexual identity has arisen. As Professor Gooren 
and a colleague put it: - 
“There should be no escape for medical and legal authorities that these definitions 
ought to be corrected and updated when new information becomes available, 
particularly when our outdated definitions bring suffering to some of our fellow 
human beings”.’ 
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XI APPENDIX C  
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XII APPENDIX D 
 
The Conclusions of Justice Richard Chisholm in Re Kevin 
 
[326] Although the extensive evidence and argument required this judgment to be 
of considerable length, in my view there are overwhelming reasons why the 
application should be granted. I see no basis in legal principle or policy why 
Australian law should follow the decision in Corbett.  To do so would, I think, 
create indefensible inconsistencies between Australian marriage law and other 
Australian laws. It would take the law in a direction that is generally contrary to 
developments in other countries. It would perpetuate a view that flies in the face of 
current medical understanding and practice.  Most of all, it would impose 
indefensible suffering on people who have already had more than their share of 
difficulty, with no benefit to society.  
 
[327] I do not agree with Mr Burmester that a decision in favour of the applicants is 
ground-breaking, or anything of that sort. It is true that this judgment canvasses 
some interesting new medical evidence, and that the discussion of legal principle 
has been wide-ranging.  While I have made findings about the medical evidence 
and offered a view about the underlying basis for such decisions as Corbett, the end 
result does not depend on acceptance of either of these matters. Ultimately, the 
basis for this judgment is very simple and mundane. It is that no good reasons have 
been shown why the ordinary legal meaning of the word "man", which includes 
post-operative female to male transsexuals, should not also apply to marriage. 
 
[328] Because the words "man and "woman" have their ordinary contemporary 
meaning, there is no formulaic solution to determining the sex of an individual for 
the purpose of the law of marriage. That is, it cannot be said as a matter of law that 
the question in a particular case will be determined by applying a single criterion, or 
limited list of criteria.  Thus it is wrong to say that a person's sex depends on any 
single factor, such as chromosomes or genital sex; or some limited range of factors, 
such as the state of the person's gonads, chromosomes or genitals (whether at birth 
or at some other time). Similarly, it would be wrong in law to say that the question 
can be resolved by reference solely to the person's psychological state, or by 
identifying the person's "brain sex".  
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[329] To determine a person's sex for the purpose of the law of marriage, all 
relevant matters need to be considered. I do not seek to state a complete list, or 
suggest that any factors necessarily have more importance than others.  However 
the relevant matters include, in my opinion, the person's biological and physical 
characteristics at birth (including gonads, genitals and chromosomes); the person's 
life experiences, including the sex in which he or she is brought up and the person's 
attitude to it; the person's self-perception as a man or woman; the extent to which 
the person has functioned in society as a man or a woman; any hormonal, surgical 
or other medical sex reassignment treatments the person has undergone, and the 
consequences of such treatment; and the person's biological, psychological and 
physical characteristics at the time of the marriage, including (if they can be 
identified) any biological features of the person's brain that are associated with a 
particular sex.  It is clear from the Australian authorities that post-operative 
transsexuals will normally be members of their reassigned sex. 
 
[330] I state my conclusions in this case as follows: - 
1. For the purpose of ascertaining the validity of a marriage under Australian law, 
the question whether a person is a man or a woman is to be determined as of the 
date of the marriage. 
2. There is no rule or presumption that the question whether a person is a man or a 
woman for the purpose of marriage law is to be determined by reference to 
circumstances at the time of birth.  Anything to the contrary in Corbett does not 
represent Australian law. 
3. In the context of the rule that the parties to a valid marriage must be a man and a 
woman, the word "man" has its ordinary current meaning according to Australian 
usage.  
4. There may be circumstances in which a person who at birth had female gonads, 
chromosomes and genitals, may nevertheless be a man at the date of his marriage. 
Anything to the contrary in Corbett does not represent Australian law. 
5. In the present case, the husband at birth had female chromosomes, gonads and 
genitals, but was a man for the purpose of the law of marriage at the time of his 
marriage, having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular the following: - 
(a) He had always perceived himself to be a male; 
(b) He was perceived by those who knew him to have had male characteristics since 
he was a young child; 
(c) Prior to the marriage he went through a full process of transsexual re-
assignment, involving hormone treatment and irreversible surgery, conducted by 
appropriately qualified medical practitioners; 
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(d) At the time of the marriage, in appearance, characteristics and behaviour he was 
perceived as a man, and accepted as a man, by his family, friends and work 
colleagues; 
(e) He was accepted as a man for a variety of social and legal purposes, including 
name, and admission to an artificial insemination program, and in relation to such 
events occurring after the marriage, there was evidence that his characteristics at the 
relevant times were no different from his characteristics at the time of the marriage; 
(f) His marriage as a man was accepted, in full knowledge of his circumstances, by 
his family, friends and work colleagues.  
6. For these reasons, the application succeeds, and there will be a declaration of the 
validity of the applicants' marriage. 
 
 
 
 
